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23 October 1959

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 46
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 4.14.80 REVIEWER:

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State Department review completed

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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700460001-9

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK Communist China - USSR: Recently available articles from Communist China's provincial press contain the most explicit admissions to date that Soviet disapproval of the communes contributed to dissension among the rank and file in the Chinese Communist party. The articles attack as "right opportunists" party members who cite Soviet abandonment of communes in the 1920s and who say, "If other socialist countries do not have communes, we should not establish them." Khrushchev's failure to endorse even the limited concept that communes are good "for China" probably has added to difficulties the Chinese leaders are having with unconvinced party members.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
Jordan-Bloc: [The British ambassador in Amman is concerned about the cordial treatment King Husayn and Prime Minister Majalli are according the visiting Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, S. P. Kiktev, the first ranking Soviet diplomat ever to visit Jordan. Husayn has stated the Soviet ambassador offered possible military and other aid "with no strings attached." The primary Soviet objective is said to be the establishment of diplomatic relations. A Jordanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 18 October that the Czech ambassador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan "next week."] [redacted]

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OK
UAR: Nasir's 21 October decree giving Vice President Marshal Amir broad executive powers in Syria apparently is a move to speed up economic and political reforms. Nasir will now almost certainly try to push ahead with activation of the representative "National Union"--the UAR's sole official political party--and toward completion of a shake-up in the Syrian Army. Cairo nevertheless still faces a prolonged period of parrying popular discontent until some real progress is made, particularly in stabilizing Syria's dislocated economy.

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Cameroun: [There are isolated acts of violence against Europeans in French-administered Cameroun, and the atmosphere is becoming more tense there and in the British Cameroons.] [redacted]

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[redacted] The extremists presumably plan these attacks as a prelude to a new campaign of violence aimed at ousting the moderate Ahidjo government before Cameroun becomes independent on 1 January.) [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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**III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

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Outlook in East, Central, and South Africa. NIE 76-59.
20 Oct 59. [REDACTED]

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Singapore--Problems and Prospects. NIE 69-59. 20 Oct 59.

[REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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[REDACTED]
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Deny Applicability of Soviet Experience With Communes

The most explicit admissions to date that Soviet disapproval of the communes contributed to dissension among the rank and file in the Chinese Communist party are contained in two recently available articles in the Chinese provincial press. A Yunnan Daily editorial on 1 September stated that some Chinese still point out that the USSR abandoned communes after a brief trial in the 1920s. Accusing these Chinese of calling for the study of Soviet experience as a pretext for criticizing the communes, the article warned that Soviet experiments must not be studied in a doctrinaire manner. The editorial argued that while it was "completely correct" for the USSR to disband its communes and "establish collective farms universally," conditions in China were different from the situation in the USSR when communes were tried there.

An article in the Szechwan Daily of 22 September quoted "right opportunist" critics in the Chinese party as stating flatly that "if other socialist countries do not have communes, we should not establish them." Deliberately avoiding any reference to Khrushchev's opposition to the communes, the article revived Stalin's statement that communes were a higher form of agricultural organization.

The resolution adopted by the Chinese central committee plenum last August, strongly reaffirming the "superiority" of the communes over the former cooperatives, is an implicit rebuke to Moscow as well as a slap at Chinese opponents of the commune program. Khrushchev's and Suslov's recent failure to endorse even the limited concept that communes are good "for China" probably has heightened Peiping's irritation and added to the difficulty the Chinese leaders are having in overcoming doubts among certain party members.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Jordanians Give Cordial Reception to Soviet Diplomat

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[Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon S. P. Kiktev has proposed to King Husayn that Jordan consider accepting possible military and economic aid from the USSR "with no strings attached," [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The King reportedly said Kiktev seemed principally interested in the establishment of Soviet-Jordanian relations, and had suggested that Husayn follow the example of Afghanistan, which continues as a monarchy and receives assistance from both the West and the USSR, including Soviet military aid.]

[British Ambassador Johnston in Amman is concerned over the cordial treatment being accorded Kiktev by the Jordanian Government. Neither Husayn nor Prime Minister Majalli has given any information directly to the British or American ambassador about the discussions with Kiktev.]

[Husayn, who is said to be discouraged and perplexed by Western hesitance regarding future aid commitments to Jordan, probably would like to explore the Soviet offer, although he also presumably is wary of offending Great Britain and the United States by accepting it. He and Majalli may fear that a Western-Soviet rapprochement might result in reductions in Western aid to Jordan which at some future time could, if necessary, be replaced by Soviet assistance.]

[A Jordanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 18 October that the Czech ambassador in Beirut is expected to visit Jordan "next week."] [REDACTED]

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UAR Vice President Given Full Powers in Syria

UAR Vice President Amir has been made virtual viceroy of the Syrian Region of the UAR in an apparent effort by Nasir to speed up urgently needed economic and political reforms. The Syrian executive council, which includes all cabinet members for the northern region of the UAR, has been made directly responsible to Amir, and the first session under his guidance has been called for 24 October.

Amir will probably lay before the council a blueprint for carrying out Nasir's long-promised program for rescuing the stagnating Syrian economy--dislocated by drought and the consequences of union with Egypt last year. Amir will probably also supervise the completion of purging the First (Syrian) Army of its various dissident elements.

There has so far been no mention of personnel changes in the Syrian ministries, except for giving Interior Minister Abd al-Hamid Sarraj the additional post of minister of propaganda and news, formerly held by the recently discharged Baathist, Riyad al-Malki.

Amir will probably follow through quickly with Nasir's plans for giving the Syrians at least a semblance of local autonomy by formation of local and provincial committees composed of individuals elected last July to the UAR's only legal political party, the National Union. Such a move, particularly if followed soon by selection of Syrians to participate in a UAR national assembly, should do much to forestall clandestine political party activity and mollify Syrian public discontent over Egyptian hegemony.

The regime, however, will continue to face popular resentment of its restrictions on the once free Syrian economy. Cairo's grandiose plans for industrialization probably will not yield significant benefits for several years, and the prospects of a satisfactory agricultural comeback next year are not bright.

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Terrorism in Cameroun

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[REDACTED]

[Sporadic acts of violence by extremist members of the outlawed nationalist movement, the Union of the Cameroons Population (UPC), are reported to be increasing in frequency both in the French-administered territory of Cameroun and in British Cameroons. Four isolated attacks were made against lone Europeans in Cameroun by UPC terrorists between 15 and 20 October. During this period French forces are reported to have captured 10 Czech automatic pistols and 1,200 rounds of 7.62 ammunition. These attacks on Europeans may have precipitated what appears to have been a counter-terrorist raid on 19 October by a group of 20 Africans and 14 Europeans against UPC supporters in British Cameroons.]

[Local British authorities, disturbed over these raids, are reported to be reinforcing their border police with two Nigerian infantry companies. In addition, two Nigerian gunboats are patrolling the coastal waters of the border area to prevent a movement of forces by sea.]

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[REDACTED]

[The UPC's capabilities probably are limited to increased guerrilla-type activity, unless it receives significant outside support. Ghana, Guinea, the UAR, and the Communist bloc have provided the UPC with some limited support, [REDACTED] but the movement continues to suffer from lack of good leadership, administration, and logistical support.] [REDACTED]

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